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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Governor Susan Schmidt Bies*
Member, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System
PROFESSOR RECHTSCHAFFEN: We are very honored
this year once more to welcome a Member of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Susan Schmidt Bies took office on December 7, 2001, to a full term as a member
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ending January 31,
2012.
Dr. Bies received a B.S. in education from the State College of New York
at Buffalo in 1967 and an M.A. (1968) and a Ph.D. (1972), both in economics,
from Northwestern University. Dr. Bies has served as a Fellow at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago (1969-70) and as a Fellow at the Northwestern
University Center for Urban Affairs (1968-69).
Before becoming a member of the Board, Dr. Bies was Executive Vice
President for Risk Management and Auditor at First Tennessee National
Corporation, Memphis, Tennessee (1995-2001). From 1979 to 1995, she served in
various other positions at First Tennessee, including Executive Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer,
Senior Vice President and Treasurer, Vice President for Corporate
Development, Tactical Planning Manager, and Economist.
Before joining First Tennessee, Dr. Bies was Associate Professor of
Economics, Rhodes College, Memphis, Tennessee (1977-79); Assistant Professor
of Economics, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan (1972-77); and Chief
Regional and Banking Structure Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis (1970-72).
Dr. Bies has been active in leadership positions for various organizations,
including the Emerging Issues Task Force of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board, the Committee on Corporate Reporting of the Financial Executives
Institute, the End Users of Derivatives Association, the American Bankers
Association, and the Bank Administration Institute.
She has also served with numerous other organizations including the
American Economic Association, Institute of Management Accountants,
International Women's Forum, American Economic Association, Economic
Association of Memphis, University of Memphis, Memphis Area Chamber of
Commerce, Memphis Youth Initiative, and Memphis Partners.
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The most important thing I want to emphasize about
Governor Bies is that she has been on both sides of the fence. She
has served as an officer of a major corporation and now as a
regulator, as a Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
We are very honored to have Governor Bies with us today.
With that, I would like to introduce a Member of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Governor Susan
Schmidt Bies.
GOVERNOR BIES:' I want to thank Dean Treanor and
Alan Rechtschaffen for the invitation to participate in this timely
symposium on corporate governance issues. When I joined the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors last December, I knew I
would be doing more than helping to set short-term interest rates.
While the general public and market focus on the decisions of the
Federal Open Market Committee, Board members spend much of
their time on various operating committees, focusing on payment
and settlement systems, and the safety and soundness of financial
institutions and markets. But the rush of current events has meant
that I have spent less of my time dusting off my economics Ph.D.
and more time using my experience as a corporate chief financial
officer, auditor, risk manager, and accountant, to consider the
policy issues of recent corporate control failures.
Today I want to focus on the role that risk management can
play in strengthening corporate governance from the point of view
of boards of directors, management, and internal control functions.
I. MANAGING RISKS

The last decades of the twentieth century were, without a
doubt, a period of dramatic change in financial engineering,
financial innovation, and risk-management practices. Enterprisewide risk management has been evolving as financial theory has
advanced, new technology has made modeling of risks more
1. Governor Susan S. Bies, Remarks by Governor Susan S. Bies, Annual
International Symposium on Derivatives and Risk Management (Oct. 8, 2002), at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021008/default.htm
(last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
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feasible, and innovation has helped to find better ways to mitigate
risk. Some types of risk are further along in the evolutionary
process.
While there are many ways to categorize risk, I will use three
broad categories for illustration-market, credit, and operating.
Operating risk is the least developed, as conceptual frameworks,
metrics, and databases are still in preliminary stages. I will come
back to the issues surrounding operating risk in a few moments.
Market risk arguably has evolved the furthest because of the
transparency of markets, frequency of transactions, and financial
engineering that can parse the various forms of risk exposure so
that appropriate financial instruments can be developed to hedge
the specific components of risk. The treasury functions of
corporations routinely use models to assess and manage price,
interest rate, liquidity, and foreign exchange risk. As a result,
managers can better anticipate changes in revenue and expense
due to these factors and develop responses to their specific
circumstances.
One tool for managing risk is securitization. Many of the assets
on a firm's balance sheet, such as receivables and customer leases,
can now be securitized-that is, grouped into pools and sold to
outside investors. Securitization helps a firm manage the risk of a
concentrated exposure by transferring some of that exposure
outside the firm. By pooling a diverse set of assets and issuing
marketable securities, firms obtain liquidity and reduce funding
costs. Of course, moving assets off the balance sheet and into
special-purpose entities, with the attendant creation of servicing
rights and high-risk residual interests retained by firms, generates
its own risks.
Derivatives are another important tool for managing risk
exposures. In the ordinary course of business, firms are exposed to
credit risk and the risk of price fluctuations in currency,
commodity, energy, and interest rate markets. For example, when
an airline sells tickets months before a flight, it becomes exposed to
fluctuations in the price of jet fuel. A higher price of jet fuel
translates directly into lower profits and, perhaps, a greater risk of
bankruptcy. Firms can now use derivatives-options, futures,
forwards, and so on-to mitigate their exposure to some of these
risks. The risk can be transferred to a counterparty that is more
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willing to bear it. In my example, the airline could buy a forward
contract or a call option on jet fuel to hedge its risk and thereby
increase its financial stability.
Another major category of risk is credit risk, which also has
become much more quantified. Models analyze a corporate
customer's or borrower's probability of default, the loss in the case
of default, and the borrower's likely exposure at the time of
default, taking into consideration future draw-downs. The greater
use of credit models in retail transactions provides a stronger
framework to assess risk and ensure that pricing reflects credit
quality. For consumer credit, however, models are less proven,
since data collection and loss estimates generally evolved after the
1990-91 recession and so have not been proven under stress
conditions or for subprime borrowers. Because many of these
borrowers did not have significant access to credit in previous
recessions, their ultimate default rate in the current cycle should
help to validate the strength of the new statistical models.
For example, the health of financial institutions today reflects
in the risk management process that has been
improvement
the
ongoing at banks for many years. Increasingly, the entire risk
management process has become more quantitative, reflecting not
only the enhanced ability and lower costs of collecting and
processing data, but also improved techniques for measuring and
managing risk. The banking industry has been able to report record
earnings in the first half of this year, despite rising loan losses for
large corporate credits and credit cards. Banks have diversified
their revenue streams to mitigate the impact on earnings during
credit cycles. And by improving risk management processes,
bankers have learned to identify risk exposures that exceed the
target return on capital and sell, hedge, or use controls to mitigate
risk exposures.
II. RISK ASSESSMENT

As corporations grow larger and more diverse, it becomes
more difficult for executive management and boards of directors to
monitor activity across the company. Directors, particularly, do not
have the time to understand all of the transactions occurring. Thus,
a key issue for boards and audit committees is how to focus their
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attention to the appropriate areas. This is where a sound risk
management and internal control framework can be very helpful.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires management to issue a
report about the quality of internal controls. A similar requirement
was put into effect for banks in the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.2 Since then, bankers have
adopted approaches along the lines of the Committee of
Sponsoring Organizations' of the Treadway Commission (COSO)
Internal Control Integrated Framework? This requires all
managers, at least once a year, to step back from other duties, and
evaluate risks and controls. Each manager considers current and
planned operation changes, identifies the risks, and determines
appropriate mitigating controls and the effectiveness of those
controls.
Managers then report their assessment up the chain of
command to the chief executive officer, with each new level of
management in turn considering the risks and controls under their
responsibility. The external auditors attest to the results of this selfassessment in banks, and results are reported to the audit
committee of the board of directors. Thus, the process helps
management communicate among themselves and with the board
about the dynamic issues affecting risk exposures, risk appetites,
and risk controls throughout the corporation.
Risk assessments such as the one outlined in COSO's internal
control framework presumably could be useful in assessing the
relative risk and returns from various lines of business when
formulating business strategies. But not all corporations and
boards consider risk as a part of their annual strategic planning or
other evaluation processes.
A study conducted this year by the Institute of Internal
Auditors and the National Association of Corporate Directors
showed that directors are not focusing on risk management."
2. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991).
3. Internal Control-IntegratedFramework Executive Summary, available at
http://www.coso.org/Publications/executive-summary-integrated-framework.htm
(last visited Jan. 28, 2003).

4. Institute of Internal Auditors and National Association of Corporate
Directors, After Enron: A survey conducted by The Institute of Internal
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Forty-five percent of directors surveyed said their organization did
not have a formal enterprise risk management process-or any
other formal method of identifying risk. An additional 19 percent
said that they were not sure whether their company had a formal
process for identifying risks.
Sound corporate governance is an essential element of a
strong risk management process. Governance involves many
players, each with specific assigned responsibilities to ensure that
the system as a whole is sufficient to support the business strategy
and ensure the effectiveness of the systems of internal control.
Directors are not expected to understand every nuance of
every line of business or to oversee every transaction. They can
look to management for that. They do, however, have the
responsibility to set the tone regarding their corporations' risktaking and to oversee the internal control processes so that they
can reasonably expect that their directives will be followed. They
also have the responsibility to hire individuals who they believe
have integrity and can exercise a high level of judgment and
competence. In the light of recent events, I might add that directors
have the further responsibility to periodically determine whether
their initial assessment of management's integrity was correct.
Indeed, beyond legal requirements, boards of directors and
managers of all firms should periodically test where they stand on
ethical business practices. They should ask, for example, "Are we
getting by on technicalities, adhering to the letter but not the spirit
of the law? Are we compensating ourselves and others on the basis
of contribution, or are we taking advantage of our positions?"
III. RISK MANAGEMENT AND INTERNAL CONTROLS

Boards of directors are responsible for ensuring that their
organizations have an effective audit process and that internal
controls are adequate for the nature and scope of their businesses.
The reporting lines of the internal audit function should be such
that the information that directors receive is impartial and not
Auditors and the National Association of Corporate Directors (Jan. 31, 2002), at
http://www.theiia.org/iia/publications/newsletters/caebuiletin/directors-enron.ppt
(last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
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unduly influenced by management. Internal audit is a key element
of management's responsibility to validate the strength of internal
controls.
Internal controls are the responsibility of line management.
Line managers must determine the level of risks they need to
accept to run their businesses and to assure themselves that the
combination of earnings, capital, and internal controls is sufficient
to compensate for the risk exposures. Supporting functions such as
accounting, internal audit, risk management, credit review,
compliance, and legal should independently monitor the control
processes to ensure that they are effective and that risks are
measured appropriately. The results of these independent reviews
should be routinely reported to executive management and boards
of directors. Both executive management and directors should be
sufficiently engaged in the process to determine whether these
reviews are in fact independent of the operating areas under
review and whether the officers conducting the reviews can,
indeed, speak freely.
In many of the recent corporate and audit firm failures that
have received public attention, basic tenets of internal control,
particularly those pertaining to operating risks, were not followed.
Recent events should remind boards of directors,
management, and auditors that internal controls and sound
governance become even more important when firms' operations
move into higher-risk areas. Indeed, when changes are happening,
control failures often increase significantly. Rapid growth, merger
of operation centers, and introduction of new products and
delivery channels are examples of situations that put stress on the
control environment.
When these types of changes occur, "people risks" rise. These
are risks that are related to training employees in new products and
processes. Employees who join the organization need to learn the
culture of the company and the control environment. Employees
unfamiliar with their new responsibilities--the systems they use,
the services they provide customers, the oversight expected by
supervisors and members of internal control functions-are all
more likely to create control breaks.
Rapid growth and change also modify the relative risks to an
organization. New lines of business may require different
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customer-qualification tests to meet the expected levels of
customer risk exposure. Further, the pressure to beat a competitor
to market with new products may shortcut the design-review
process and omit an important control or allow a programming
error to adversely affect the software used to deliver the services.
Many of the companies that have been the center of recent
governance failures demonstrate some similar characteristics. They
were lead by hard-charging entrepreneurs whose ability to think
outside the box pioneered advances in new lines of business. But
the personalities of these individuals, in many cases, led to a focus
on sales growth and support and inadequate time spent building
the control infrastructure.
Another form of people risk is internal fraud. When
expectations of the market and supervisors, or pressures of
personal life become overwhelming key officers may step over the
ethical and legal boundaries and cover up errors or purposely steal
from the corporation. While executive fraud is very difficult to
detect, it is eventually discovered. Obviously, during the past year,
we've seen severe reactions to observed failures within
corporations-not only from investors and creditors, but also from
lawmakers and regulators.
Although risk management has become much more
quantitative, considerable management judgment must be applied
to the risk management process. Frequent, small losses can
generally be absorbed in the operating margin of the product or
service. It is the low-probability, large losses that provide the
greatest challenge. And, it is just such risks-the ones that can
severely damage, if not kill, an organization--that too many
enterprises do not formally take into consideration.
When one looks at the extreme loss events for many types of
operating risks, for example, executive frauds, it is easy to
recognize that the normal bell-shaped probability distribution does
not fit. Rather, the extremely long-or fat-tailed distributions
emphasize that risk management and internal control judgments
must be applied. What is even more difficult, is that some
exposures can better be classed as uncertainties than as risks. That
is, patterns of losses, and risk drivers, are very hard to identify.
Terrorist attacks, technology breakthroughs, and other events that
cannot be defined ahead of time often have significant implications
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for the loss exposures of corporations.
Indeed, recent events have demonstrated that the complexity
and size of modern corporations create significant market risk
exposures that give management and the board of directors little
time to react after serious breaches in internal controls become
known. Reputation risk, especially in a trust business like banking,
can lead to loss of liquidity, cancellation of major new contracts,
and indictments, which bring the ultimate corporate loss-failure
of the firm. And as we have seen, the market's response can be
harsh.
IV. RISK MANAGEMENT AND DISCLOSURE
The intended or unintended consequences of the opaqueness
that comes with complexity raise serious issues for financial
reporting and corporate governance. Effective governance requires
investors and creditors to hold firms accountable for their
decisions. But they must first have the information necessary to
understand the risks that the firm is bearing and those it has
transferred to others. Here again, enterprise risk management can
provide a framework through which management and boards can
convey appropriate information that will allow outsiders to
understand the company's risk exposures and how the company
limits and manages those risks.
Public disclosures by corporations need not follow a standard
framework that is exactly the same for all. Rather, we should insist
that each entity disclose the information it believes its stakeholders
need to evaluate its risk profile. Each business line in a complex
organization is unique, and-to be most effective-the specific
disclosures of its risks should be different, too. Even in smaller
organizations, disclosures should be tailored to reflect the activities
of the organization. A summary of the information that executive
management and the board of directors need to monitor the health
of the enterprise is an excellent place to start when tailoring the
information that would be useful to investors and customers.
Disclosure rules that are too rigid may become incompatible with
risk management processes that continually evolve.
Disclosures should clearly identify all significant risk
exposures-whether on or off the balance sheet-and their impact
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on the firm's financial condition and performance, cash flow, and
earnings potential. With regard to securitizations, derivatives, and
other innovative risk-transfer instruments, traditional accounting
disclosures of a company's balance sheet at a single point in time
may not be sufficient to convey the full impact of a company's
financial prospects.
For example, if a firm securitizes receivables through
commercial paper conduits, those receivables are no longer on the
company's books under current accounting standards. Yet the
aging of receivables is a key indicator that investors and lenders
use to assess the quality of sales and operations. If the receivables
move off the balance sheet, information about the aging of the
receivables should continue to be part of the firm's disclosures.
Equally important are disclosures about how risks are being
managed and the underlying basis for values and other estimates
that are included in financial reports. These disclosures should
identify key risk drivers and describe the range of possible
outcomes. Unlike typical accounting reports, information
generated by risk management tends to be oriented less to a point
in time and more to a description of the risks and the variability of
results.
To take an example from the world of banking where the
discipline of risk management is relatively well developed, an
accounting report might say that the fair value of an investment
portfolio is $300 million and has dropped $10 million from the last
report. However, the bank's internal risk report would show much
more extensive information, such as the interest rate, maturity, and
credit quality of the assets and the range of values the portfolio
would take under alternative future scenarios. The user of a riskmanagement report could determine whether changes in value
were due to declining credit quality, rising interest rates, portfolio
sales, or payoffs of underlying loans.
Corporate risk officers have developed other types of reports
that provide information on the extent to which the total return in
a particular line of business compensates for the line's
comprehensive risk. On an enterprise basis, a reader of covariance
reports can determine whether the growing lines of business have
risk exposures that tend to offset those in other business
lines-thereby resulting in lower volatility for the earnings of the
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corporation as a whole. If the lines of business have high
correlations, investors would expect management and the boards
of directors to have in place more significant processes to monitor
and mitigate those risks.
Complex organizations should continue to improve their riskmanagement and reporting functions. When they are comfortable
with the reliability and consistency of the information in these
reports, they should begin disclosing this information to the
market, perhaps in summary form, paying due attention to the
need for keeping proprietary business data confidential. Not only
would such disclosure provide more qualitative and quantitative
information about the firm's current risk exposure to the market, it
would also help the market assess the quality of the risk oversight
and risk appetite of the organization.
A sound risk-management system in a complex organization
should continually monitor all relevant risks, including credit,
market, liquidity, operational, and reputation risks. Reputation
risk, which recent events have shown can make or break a
company, becomes especially hard to manage when off-balancesheet activities conducted in a separate legal entity can affect the
parent firm's reputation. For all these risks, disclosures consistent
with the information used internally by risk managers could be
very beneficial to market participants.
In conclusion, an effective enterprise-wide risk management
process can provide executive management and the board of
directors with a framework to strengthen the governance process.
Risk management can identify where exposures exceed the risktolerance limits and determine where investments in enhanced
controls can most effectively mitigate remaining risks. The
evolution of risk management can provide metrics for management
and the board of directors to assess the relative returns from
various forms of risk exposures and can help shape strategic
decisions. For companies undergoing rapid growth and those
engaged in relatively new business processes and practices, risk
management can provide a method for developing an internal
control infrastructure to support the success of the business
strategy.
Further, the risk management framework can improve the
transparency of disclosures to help investors and customers better
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understand the operations of the firm. I particularly want to
emphasize that disclosure need not be in a standard accounting
framework or exactly the same for all organizations. Rather, each
entity should disclose the information its stakeholders need to best
evaluate the entity's risk profile. Companies should be less
concerned about the vehicle of disclosure and more concerned
about the substance of the information made available to the
public.
No business can afford to remain static, and firms of all sizes
should continually pursue better ways to manage risk. The
discipline of risk management is still relatively young. Investments
in better forms of risk management processes often reduce losses
and provide a more robust framework for evaluating business
alternatives. Following sound risk management, governance, and
disclosure practices consistently is also crucial to maintaining the
confidence of capital and financial markets. Boards of directors
and executive management are responsible for ensuring that the
corporate governance process is conducted with competence and
integrity. If they do, our economic system should grow stronger
That is the end of my formal remarks, but I would be glad to
take any questions from the floor.
PROFESSOR RECHTSCHAFFEN: Governor Bies, you
talked about directors' lack of focus on risk management and the
concept of reputational risk. I think that shareholders now are
focused on risk management. Who is going to sound the "all clear"
for shareholders? Who is going to make people more confident so
America can continue to fetch the America premium? What is
going to occur for me to go invest the money I have in the bank so
I would feel comfortable that now corporate governance rules are
in place that are going to make people act honestly when you
cannot legislate others?
GOVERNOR BIES: I think we are still in a repair phase of
the recent events. Clearly, confidence is lacking in markets today,
and investors are right in waiting to see what is really going to
happen as an outcome of all of this.
One of the things I find the saddest in this whole episode is
that the groups who should be leading the charge and strengthen
the focus of their responsibilities-mainly the outside and internal
accounting and audit professions--have generally been very silent,
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particularly the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AICPA").
You know, one of the things-as was said earlier today, public
accountants are there not for management, not for the boards, but
to attest to investors, to attest to customers who enter into longterm contracts with companies, that "this is a sound, reputable
company I can do business with." But those outside auditors, we
have learned, are much more interested in cross-selling additional
services than in what their framework is for really servicing their
true calling.
We would not really need outside auditors if we lived in a
world of management reporting. Any company can do their
internal books any way they want. We only have them to display
information to the world.
I sat with a group of corporate financial officers a few years
ago, and we were all concerned at the time because we were not
getting enough good talent in the colleges and universities in
auditing and accounting, so we were having difficulty recruiting
enough students. The AICPA very proudly showed us this
videotape they wanted us to take along on our visits to campuses to
help recruit students into the exciting world of accounting.
When you looked at this recruiting tape, it talked about how
you too can be an accountant and work on strategic issues,
shoulder-to-shoulder with the CEOs of the companies, and how
you are going to be able to look at new technologies and new
products and help design business processes.
Nowhere in this ten-minute video did it say:
Folks, you are entering into a profession that is at the core of
the foundation of the American capitalist system, which relies
on full, open, transparent disclosure to investors. You play a
critical role in that. You have got to make sure that these
reports fairly reflect what is going on in companies. And your
life is going to be tough, because you, as a young person
particularly, are going to have to stand up to CEOs and tell
them when controls are broken, and you are going to have to
stand up to business line managers and tell them when the way
that they want to account for a particular transaction is not
appropriate. It is going to build your character very quickly.

lihe real-life experience of what young folks will go through as
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they enter the profession of accounting and auditing were not
described in this film. And I think it is because the whole AICPA
profession is just focused on cross-selling, cross-selling, crossselling, and not the core values.
And until we get back to the core values, I worry about how
we are going to restore confidence. Maybe the market will say,
"Gee, we have not had a breakdown that has been publicly
announced in the last six months; that is behind us."
But, long term, we are not going to get at it until all of these
things that were talked about in earlier panels do - boards really
look at risk management, really have management involved in
looking at risk - and do not use internal controls as a way to cut
expenses when earnings are tough, because that is when you need
them the most. Control stress breaks happen more when earnings
are weaker.
QUESTIONER: Governor Bies, you brought up the fact that
two-thirds of the corporations do not have central risk
management departments. This is really horrible to hear. Through
my experience of about six years in the financial industry with a
number of global investment banks, I have noticed that we have
department-specific control rooms for compliance officers or risk
management controls.
Do you have any data on corporations having the departmentspecific controls while not having the central risk management,
company-wide risk management group?
GOVERNOR BIES: I do not have that, but I would say that is
one of the concerns we have, and I have as a bank regulator,
because if the control oversight is only within the business unit,
where is the independent judgment coming in? It compromises.
Very often, we will find control units part of the business unit,
where the individuals do not feel empowered and are not effective
in getting the senior management in that business line to make the
changes necessary to enhance controls.
That is one advantage of having enterprise control functions, is
that the individual-whether it is a compliance officer, a risk
manager, a credit underwriter-can go to a similar function in the
corporation as a whole and say, "Look, I am not getting
anywhere."
And, likewise, if you have an enterprise system, you can look
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at the effectiveness. Maybe to cut cost they downplayed it, put a
rookie in. For example, one of the recent publicly known
breakdowns occurred because the young auditor who was told to
look at foreign exchange controls had never seen one before. You
know, it would be a miracle if that young person could have found
it in his first engagement.
So I am leery that you can really say you have got an effective
system of internal controls and governance if you do not have an
ability to have an independent oversight outside of that line of
business.
QUESTIONER: Thank you, Governor Bies. In your remarks
you indicated that growth industries are most at risk for these kind
of audit problems. Other than maybe the high-tech industries,
which everybody is familiar with, do any others come to mind?
GOVERNOR BIES: I would say any company around. And
just think about it. If you have got stable management, stable
products, stable systems, stable people, you know what you are
doing. Risk happens when you have breakdown in processes, and
so you have systems changes, you have people without the
knowledge, you have got unanticipated sales volumes, and there is
pressure on management to make those numbers.
Change itself is an important driver of control issues. If you
look at the framework on COSO, or if you look at basic texts in
audit, you will find that is a theme that recurs all the time. It is true
for big companies and small companies. It is true for even what
you might consider a stodgy industry. I mean, if you look at
banking, for example, we see control breakdowns in fast-growing
banks, just because - you know, it may only be a $50 million bank,
but it is a young enterprise that is growing very quickly. Well, you
have got people trying to do multiple things at the same time; they
are trying to learn to work together. They say, "Oh, I thought you
were going to do that." "No, you were going to do that." Your
responsibilities are moving, and whenever the dynamics are that
intense, you have a greater likelihood for breakdowns to occur.
PROFESSOR FELSENFELD: Governor Bies, thank you
very much for coming.
GOVERNOR BIES: Thank
you.
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